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Constitutional Analysis of Indiana's
Controlled Substance Excise Tax
F ANTHONY PAGANELLI'
The question is no less than whether courts must put up with shifts and
subterfuges in the place of truth and are powerless to put an end to trifling.
They would prove themselves incapable of dealing with actualities if it
were so, for there is no surer sign of a feeble and fumbling law than
timidity in penetrating the form to the substance.'
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1992, Indiana's Controlled Substance Excise Tax ("the Tax" or
"the Act") became effective after little opposition in the Indiana General
Assembly 2 Passage of the Act added Indiana to the growing number of states
taxing the illegal possession of controlled substances. Section five of the Act
briefly describes its scope:
Sec. 5. The controlled substance excise tax is imposed on controlled
substances that are:
(1) delivered;
(2) possessed; or
(3) manufactured;
in Indiana in violation of IC 35-48-4 or 21 U.S.C. 841 through 21 U.S.C.
852.
4
The Act exempts pharmacists and other persons lawfully registered to
dispense controlled substances.-
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, The
University of Notre Dame. Special thanks to Professor Tom Schomhorst for his guidance and helpful
comments, and to the Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Monroe Circuit Court, for providing the fascinating
research assignment upon which this Note is based. The opinions expressed herein, however, are mine
alone. Thanks also to my family and to Dawn M. Shea for their love and support.
1. Loubnel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1926) (Learned Hand, J.).
2. See STATE OF INDIANA, INDEX TO HOUSE AND SENATE JOURNALS, 107th Gen. Assembly, 2d
Regular Sess., at 140 (1992) (reporting that the Act passed in the House by a 96-2 vote and passed the
Senate by a vote of 43-6).
3. Other state controlled substance tax statutes include: ALA. CODE §§ 40-17A-1 to -16 (1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-28.7-101 to -109 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-650 to -660 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-15-1 to -11 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 63-
4201 to -4211 (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 520/1-/26 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-5201 to -5211 (1989 & Supp. 1993); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 4432-36
(1990 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 297D.01-.14 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-
101 to -123 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-4301 to -4316 (1990 & Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 372A.010-.150 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-18A-1 to -7 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 105-113.105 to -113.113 (1992 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 57-36.1-01 to -16
(1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-49-1 to -16 (Supp. 1994); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 159.001-.301 (West
1992 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-19-101 to -107 (Michie 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 139.87-.96 (West Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-405(a)(xix) (1994).
4. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-5 (1993). The code references are to the state and federal code sections
proscribing the delivery, possession, or manufacture of controlled substances.
5. See id.
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The Act levies a tax upon controlled substances-based on substance type
and weight-ranging from $10 per gram on Schedule V substances to $40 per
gram on Schedule I, II, or III substances.6 The amount of tax is based on the
weight of the possessed substance, regardless of its degree of purity or
dilution.7 The tax is due upon receipt or manufacture of the substance' and
every forty-eight hours thereafter.9 The taxpayer receives a receipt verifying
payment but stating expressly that payment of the tax does not "legalize the
delivery, sale, possession, or manufacture of a controlled substance."'"
The Act provides that "[t]he payment of the tax under this chapter does not
make the buyer immune from criminal prosecution. However, confidential
information acquired by the department may not be used to initiate or
facilitate prosecution for an offense other than an offense based on a violation
of this chapter."" Moreover, the Act states that "[a] person may not be
required to reveal the person's identity at the time the tax is paid."' 2
Nonpayment of the tax subjects the taxpayer to a 100% penalty in addition
to the tax.' 3 Additionally, "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally
delivers, possesses, or manufactures a controlled substance without having
paid the tax due commits a Class D felony "'4 This felony provision applies
only when the underlying possession offense is itself a felony "5
Challenges based on taxpayers' rights under the Double Jeopardy 16 and
Self-Incrimination Clauses 7 of the United States Constitution have met with
mixed success against other states' drug tax statutes. In June, 1994, the United
States Supreme Court struck down Montana's drug tax statute on double
6. Id. § 6-7-3-6 (1993). Indiana's Criminal Code classifies controlled substances into five
"schedules," numbered I through V, based on their individual and group characteristics. Schedule I
substances, for example, include those with a high potential for abuse and no accepted use in medical
treatment in the United States. Id. § 35-48-2-3 (1993). Marijuana and heroin are typical Schedule I
substances. For a description and explanation of the schedule classification system, see id. § 35-48-2-1
to -14 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
7. Id. § 6-7-3-6.
8. Id. § 6-7-3-8 (1993).
9. Id. § 6-7-3-10(b) (1993).
10. Id. § 6-7-3-10(a) (1993).
11. Id. § 6-7-3-9 (1993).
12. Id. § 6-7-3-8.
13. Id. § 6-7-3-11 (a) (1993).
14. Id. § 6-7-3-11(b) (1993).
15. Id. See generally id. § 35-48-4-11 (1993) (specifying when possession of marijuana, hash oil,
or hashish is a Class A misdemeanor and when it is a Class D felony).
16. See, e.g., Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), cert. denied,
No. 1910187, 1992 Ala. LEXIS at *171 (Ala., Jan. 31, 1992); Sorensen v. State Dep't of Revenue, 836
P.2d 29 (Mont. 1992); Olivam v. State, 838 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. CL App. 1992); State v. Riley, 479
N.W.2d 234 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
17. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Briney, 594 So. 2d 120; Hams v. State
Dep't of Revenue, 563 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1990); State
v. Smith, 813 P.2d 888 (Idaho 1991); State v. Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1992); State v.
Durrant, 769 P.2d 1174 (Kan.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989); Sisson v. Tnplett, 428 N.W.2d 565
(Minn. 1988); State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986); Lopez v. State, 837 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. CL
App. 1992); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
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jeopardy grounds in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.' Other
unsuccessful claims have been brought against these state drug tax acts based
on cruel and unusual punishment, 9 procedural due process," and equal
protection 2' theories. Indiana's statute has already faced multiple challenges
at the trial level, and courts in several Indiana counties already consider the
Act unconstitutional.22
Self-incrimination challenges require no special analysis beyond inquiry into
the workings of the Act. The underlying argument in double jeopardy
analysis, however, is that the Act is not truly a tax, but a regulatory or
punitive measure in disguise. Such an argument requires looking beyond the
statute's language to divine the legislature's true intent. Whether an Indiana
court may conduct such an inquiry is a matter of some doubt-even after
Kurth Ranch-because of Indiana's strongly pro-legislature rules of statutory
construction.23
Application of the Act also triggers a provision of the Indiana Constitution
having no federal counterpart. Article X, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution
provides for equal and just taxation of all property. Excise taxes are exempt
from this requirement.24 While this Act is labeled an excise tax, that label
may not accurately describe its true nature. If the Act is not a true excise tax,
but rather a tax on property, it must provide for equal taxation or fail as
contrary to the Indiana Constitution.
This Note examines the merits of the strongest constitutional challenges to
the Act. Specifically, constitutional challenges that have been successful
against other state drug taxes, such as those based on self-incrimination and
double jeopardy, as well as the Article X, section 1 theory mentioned above,
will all be analyzed.
Part I reviews the development of the legal doctrines that led to the passage
of Indiana's Controlled Substance Excise Tax. Part II analyzes whether the
courts, in assessing the Act's constitutionality, may look beyond the "tax"
language in the Act, or whether the rules of statutory construction require
deference to the labels affixed by the legislature. In addition, Part II then
questions whether the Act is truly a tax measure, or is instead a punitive
18. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Zissi, 842 P.2d at 857-59.
20. See, e.g., Hyatt v. State Dep't of Revenue, 597 So. 2d 716 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); Rehg v.
Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1992); State v. Berberich, 811 P.2d 1192 (Kan. 1991);
State v. Matson, 798 P.2d 488 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 249 Kan. 777 (1991); State v.
Heredia, 493 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2386 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Zissi, 842 P.2d at 855-57.
22. Courts in Cass and Greene counties have struck down the Act on various grounds. Monroe
County, which contains the state's only unified circuit court system, has seen a split. Two judges have
upheld the Act, while a third has ruled it unconstitutional. See State v. Elvers, 09C01-9207-CF-001 19
(Cass Cir. Ct., Order of Apr. 5, 1993); State v. Hayes, 28D01-9209-CF-519 (Greene Sup. Ct., Order of
Apr. 16, 1993); State v. Wagers, 53D01-9304-00253 (Monroe Cir. Ct. I, Order of Oct. 12, 1993); see
also Kurt Vander Dussen, Local Judges Divided on Indiana Law, HERALD TiMEs (Bloomington, Ind.),
June 7, 1994, at A7.
23. See infra part II.A.
24. IND. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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measure in disguise. Part III analyzes the challenges that may be brought
against the Act as a tax measure and, therefore, whether it complies with the
Indiana Constitution's Equal Rate of Taxation Clause and the.Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause of the United States Constitution. Part IV assumes that the tax
is actually regulatory or punitive, and examines the double jeopardy challenge
that may be brought against it on that ground.
I. SOURCES OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
Taxing illegal conduct is not a novel concept. The government's power to
tax illegal activities was not always clear, however, and may not be taken for
granted. This Part reviews the development of the doctrine that led to the
taxation of controlled substances. As early as 1864, Congress attempted to
cast its taxation net broadly to include those individuals who profited from
illegal conduct, such as dealing in lottery tickets or liquor." In one 1864
revenue act, Congress "enacted that no persons should be engaged in certain
trades or businesses, including those of selling lottery tickets and retail
dealing in liquors, until they should have obtained a 'license' from the United
States. 26 The statute further provided that "no license so granted, or special
tax so laid, should be construed to authorize any business within a State
prohibited by the laws thereof. '27 Faced with challenges from taxpayers
arguing that Congress could not tax illegal conduct, the Supreme Court in the
License Tax Cases28 upheld the act's constitutionality, finding that "[t]here
is nothing hostile or contradictory in the acts of Congress to the
legislation of the States [outlawing the taxed conduct]. What the latter
prohibits, the former, if the business is found existing notwithstanding the
prohibition, discourages by taxation. 29
Congressional power to tax illegal conduct thus seemed well-established
until 1913, when the advent of the federal income tax" rised new disputes
about the taxation of illegal activities. In United States v. Sullivan,31 Justice
Holmes wrote: "We see no reason why the fact that a business is unlawful
should exempt it from paying the taxes that if lawful it would have to
pay "32 Nearly two decades later, however, the Court in Commissioner v.
Wilcox3 3 held that Wilcox, a convicted embezzler, could not be taxed on
embezzled funds because he did not earn the money under a bona fide claim
of right. The Wilcox Court reasoned that without some valid claim to income,
25. E.g., Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 113, 116, 137, 141; Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78,
13 Stat. 472, 485; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 248, 249, 252.
26. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 463 (1866) (footnote omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 473.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
31. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
32. Id. at 263.
33. 327 U.S. 404 (1946), overruled in part by James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
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a taxpayer cannot be said to have received any taxable gain or profit under the
Internal Revenue Code.34
Confusing matters further, six years later in Rutkn v. United States,35 the
Court heard a claim similar to that addressed in Wilcox, but reached the
opposite result. Rutkin had been convicted of extortion, and the funds he
extorted were taxed as income. The Court, while specifically declining to
overrule Wilcox, found that there was no basis for Rutkin's claim that the
Government could not tax his illegally earned income.36
In 1961, the Court in James v. United States37 resolved the conflict in
favor of the reasoning in Rutkin and the License Tax Cases. In James, the
Court explained that "[i]t had been a well-established principle, long before
Rutkin or Wilcox, that unlawful, as well as lawful, gains are comprehended
within the term 'gross income ' ' 38 under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The James Court referred to the "'widespread and settled administrative and
judicial recognition of the taxability of unlawful gains of many kinds."'' 39
James went beyond Rut'kin, however, and expressly overruled Wilcox in an
effort to "correct the error and the confusion resulting from it."'40 The
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") formalized the James holding by amending
its tax regulations to comport with the decision.4'
Although the government's power to tax illegal activities seemed at last to
have acquired solid constitutional support, taxpayers persisted in their
challenges to measures taxing specific criminal pursuits such as the illegal
possession of firearms,42 wagering, 43 and the possession of controlled
substances." Although some of these statutes were struck down, the ruling
courts specifically held that, assuming Congress could avoid certain
constitutional pitfalls, the government still had the power to place a tax on
specific acts of illegal conduct.
In Haynes v. United States,45 the defendant challenged a taxation and
registration requirement under the National Firearms Act. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, held that
this Court must give deference to Congress' taxing powers, and to
measures reasonably incidental to their exercise; but we are no less obliged
to heed the limitations placed upon those powers by the Constitution's
34. Id. at 408. The Internal Revenue Code section cited in Wilcox, § 22(a), was recodified as § 61
by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See I.RtC. § 61 (1988).
35. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
36. Id. at 135.
37. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
38. Id. at 218.
39. Id. (quoting Rutkin, 343 U.S. at 137).
40. Id. at 221.
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 1965) (stating that "[illegal gains constitute gross
income")
42. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5845 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
43.26 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4424 (1988). For a detailed list of state laws which, at that time, taxed illegal
wagering and pnvate lotteries, see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,44-45 n.5, 46-47 n.6 (1968).
44. Marihuana Tax Act, ch. 553, § 7(a), (b), (c), 50 Stat. 554 (1939) (repealed 1970).
45. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
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other commands. Accordingly, nothing we do today will prevent the
effective regulation or taxation by Congress of firearms.46
Marchetti v. United States,47 a companion case to Haynes, exhibited a similar
qualified deference to the will of the legislature, yet held that, as applied, a
federal wagering tax statute s violated taxpayers' privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. The defendant in Marchetti challenged a tax on illegally
gained gambling earnings. The Court explained:
The Constitution of course obliges this Court to give full recognition to the
taxing powers and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise. But
we are equally obliged to give full effect to the constitutional restrictions
which attend the exercise of those powers. We do not, as we have said,
doubt Congress' power to tax activities which are, wholly or in part,
unlawful.49
In Leary v. United States,0 the Supreme Court used the Marchetti test to
strike down the federal Marihuana Tax Act. Dr. Timothy Leary was
apprehended entering the United States from Mexico in possession of illegal
drugs and charged with violating the federal Marihuana Tax Act.5' Dr. Leary
argued successfully that compliance with the Act would require him to
incriminate himself by admitting that he illegally possessed the drug. The
Leary Court did not specifically address whether the government had the right
to tax the illegal possession of controlled substances, seemingly taking this
fact for granted in its blanket adoption of the Marchetti reasoning. However,
a later Fifth Circuit case, Vasilinda v. United States, 52 held that the
government did have such a right.
Obviously, cases upholding various drug taxes contain the implicit holding
that state governments may tax the illegal possession of controlled substances.
Only one state court has clearly based its holding on this underlying power.
In State v Durrant,53 the Supreme Court of Kansas relied on Marchetti and
granted the same qualified deference to the taxing power of the legislature.
As the Durrant court explained:
While some have questioned the propriety of a governmental entity
imposing a tax upon an illegal act, the United States Supreme Court has
held that a tax may be imposed on an activity that is wholly or partially
unlawful under state or federal statutes. In doing so, however, the
government may not violate constitutional restrictions, including the
privilege against self-incrimination. 54
46. Id. at 98; see also Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58 ("We do not, as we have said, doubt Congress'
power to tax activities which are, wholly or in part, unlawful.").
47. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
48. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411, 4412 (1988).
49. Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58. For a detailed analysis of Marchetti's principal holding on self-
incrimination, see infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
50. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
51. Ch. 553, § 7(a), (b), (c), 50 Stat. 554 (repealed 1970).
52. 487 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. 769 P.2d 1174 (Kan.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989).
54. Id. at 1179 (citations omitted).
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As a result, states can now confidently apply the principles first espoused
in the License Tax Cases to tax the possession of controlled substances.
Nevertheless, courts generally agree that the government's power is not
absolute. As cases such as Haynes and Marchetti demonstrate, deference to
the legislature's taxing power will not extend so far as to condone violations
of basic constitutional rights. Consequently, the primary inquiry into Indiana's
Controlled Substance Excise Tax is to determine whether the legislature has
abused the courts' qualified deference by trampling upon taxpayers' rights.
II. CONSTRUING INDIANA'S CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE EXCISE TAX
Entitled the "Controlled Substance Excise Tax," the Act appears to be a tax
measure. It is included within the Indiana Code title on taxation and speaks
throughout of an excise tax imposed on controlled substances. 5 Presumably,
the Indiana General Assembly intended for this statute to be read as such.
Certain challenges to the constitutionality of the Act, however, hinge on the
argument that the Act is not a tax, and that the factors leading one to construe
the Act as a tax are subterfuge. These challenges are based on the underlying
argument that the Controlled Substance Excise Tax is actually designed to
impose additional punishment upon those individuals illegally possessing
controlled substances. Before examining whether the "tax" language in the Act
is pretextual, however, this Note will first inquire when, if ever, the
legislature's classification of a statute may be challenged when the legislation
in question is facially unambiguous.
A. Indiana's Rules of Statutory Construction
Any attack on the Act based upon a legislative intent which is not apparent
from the face of the statute may fall on deaf ears in Indiana. Generally, unless
the language of the statute is ambiguous, an Indiana court may not look
beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language to attempt statutory
construction.56
55. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-5.
56. See R.L. v. State, 437 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Jones v. Hendricks County Plan
Comm'n, 435 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); see also Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court No. I, 291
N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ind. 1973) ("None will dispute that m construing statutes, it is our duty to give effect
to the plain and manifest meaning of the language used.").
The only possible textual ambiguity on the face of the Act from which one could infer a criminal
purpose is the repeated cross-reference to the Criminal Code to supply definitions and classifications.
Characterizing this "borrowing" of text as an ambiguity, however, is a tenuous assertion at best. The
more plausible position is that, by using consistent definitions and classifications, the Code has
eliminated the ambiguities that may be caused by varying definitions of the same terms within a
statutory compilation. See IND. CODE § 6-7-3-1 to -5 (1993). It is noteworthy, however, that § 6-7-3-8
also provides that the tax is due when a person receives or manufactures a controlled substance in
violation of the criminal statute. Thus, the tax is due only when the taxpayer commits a crime. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
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There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Indiana courts recognize
the well-established rule of statutory construction that tax statutes are
construed in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the state.57 This rule
"'must be applied in conjunction with the basic principle that all statutes
should be read where possible to give effect to the intent of the legisla-
ture."'5 8 Thus, a court interpreting a taxing measure must read the statute in
such a manner as to ascertain the legislative intent while simultaneously
favoring the taxpayer in any dispute as to the statute's interpretation.
Applied to the Controlled Substance Excise Tax, this rule does little to
assist a taxpayer asking the Indiana courts to look beyond the Act's clear
language. If it is to construe language at all, let alone strictly, a court must
find some ambiguity in the language to interpret. If statutory language is
ambiguous, then the courts will search for legislative intent.59 Logically, the
converse should be true: If there is no ambiguity, the court need not explore
the legislative intent. Courts have recognized, however, that such a strict rule
would allow pretextual statutes to subvert many constitutional protections
when clear statutory language belies an invalid legislative intent. For example,
one Indiana court has acknowledged that "[a] court would be remiss to close
its eyes to a latent ambiguity in a statute created by legislative history,
legislative purpose and the dictates of justice, for these are matters to be
considered in interpreting any statute. '"6 This, too, is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction focusing on the principle that "[t]he intention of the
lawmakers constitutes the law "61 If the intention of the lawmakers runs
counter to the interests of justice, courts must look beyond language that
camouflages the legislature's true purpose. As Judge Learned Hand once
observed, "[T]here is no surer sign of a feeble and fumbling law than timidity
in penetrating the form to the substance. 62
Any sincere and effective constitutional analysis of the Act must look below
the surface of the text. Because the "primary rule for judicial construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature," 63 Indiana
courts should be permitted to search beyond the clear language of the statute,
and should be encouraged to interpret the Act strictly against the state to
uncover any "latent ambiguity" created by the intent of the legislature.
57. See, e.g., Van Orman v. State, 416 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Fans Mailing, Inc.
v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 557 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. Tax 1990); see also Gross Income Tax
Div. v. Surface Combustion Corp., 11I N.E.2d 50, 63 (Ind.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 829 (1953);
Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 321 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
58. Faris Mailing, 557 N.E.2d at 716 (quoting Park 100 Dev. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue,
429 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ind. 1981)); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 286 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. 1972);
Kinder v. Doe, 540 N.E.2d 111, 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
59. Jones, 435 N.E.2d at 83.
60. Morgan County R.E.M.C. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 293 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ind. Ct.
App.), rev'd, 302 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. 1973); see also Woods v. State, 140 N.E.2d 752, 754 (Ind. 1957).
61. Morgan County R.E.M.C., 293 N.E.2d at 240 (citation omitted).
62. Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1926).
63. Morgan County R.E.M.C., 293 N.E.2d at 240.
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A party seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of an Indiana statute
faces yet another tradition of judicial deference to the will of the legisla-
ture.' A strong line of case law has created a safe haven against constitu-
tional challenges for Indiana statutes. To say that an act of the legislature is
protected by a strong presumption of constitutionality is a legal understate-
ment.65 Indiana courts have consistently held that "[a] court may not hold an
act unconstitutional except on the clearest showing of invalidity [and all]
doubts must be resolved in favor of the statute. '66 Specifically, "every
enactment of our General Assembly stands before [an Indiana court] cloaked
with a presumption of constitutionality "67 The burden on one challenging the
constitutionality of an Indiana statute is similar to that imposed upon the
prosecution attempting to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
68
The result of this presumption, and the corresponding difficulty in
overcoming it, is that "[w]hen a statute can be construed to support its
constitutionality, such construction must be adopted. 69 Such are the major
obstacles facing those who would challenge the Controlled Substance Excise
Tax in Indiana courts. Consequently, any challenge to the Tax must
demonstrate that the only reasonable construction of the Act is an unconstitu-
tional one.
B. Classifyng the Controlled Substance Excise Tax
Is the Controlled Substance Excise Tax truly a tax, or is it a punitive
measure in disguise? While the Act is labeled a tax, "the nature of the tax
must be determined by its operation and incidence, rather than by its title or
designation made by the legislature. In other words, the legislature may not
change a factual situation by giving it a different name or designation. 7 °
The legislature's intent in passing the Act may be scrutinized,7' and Indiana
64. The Controlled Substance Excise Tax is subject to both federal and state constitutional
challenges. To avoid unnecessarily covering well-documented ground by examining the standards of
review and burdens of proof involved in challenges under the United States Constitution, this Part will
focus instead on the special presumptions existing in Indiana to preserve a state law's constitutionality.
65. See Taxpayers Lobby v. Orr, 311 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 1974).
66. Id. (citation omitted); see also Roeschlen v. Thomas, 280 N.E.2d 581, 589 (Ind. 1972); State
v. Clark, 217 N.E.2d 588, 590 (Ind. 1966); Wright Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 133 N.E.2d 713 (Ind.
1956). The court of appeals in Puntney v. Puntney held that this presumption may be defeated only by
demonstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. 420 N.E.2d 1283, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981).
67. Eddy v. McGinnis, 523 N.E.2d 737, 738 (Ind. 1988); see also Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64,
71 (Ind. 1987); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Highways, 439 N.E.2d 1129,
1132 (Ind. 1982).
68. See Championship Wrestling, Inc. v. State Boxing Comm'n, 477 N.E.2d 302,305 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) ("The burden is on the challenger to clearly demonstrate the statute's invalidity, and all doubts
are resolved in favor of the statute."); see also Avco Fin. Servs. v. Metro Holding Co., 563 N.E.2d
1323, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (granting "all reasonable presumptions" in favor of the constitutionality
of the statute).
69. Miller, 517 N.E.2d at 71.
70. Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721, 723 (Ind. 1962).
71. See supra 56-63 and accompanying text.
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courts have established a test to guide that scrutiny In Besozzi v. Indiana
Employment Security Board,2 the Indiana Supreme Court reasoned that
"where the primary purpose is regulation and not revenue, there is an exercise
of the police power, rather than the taxing power, the raising of revenue rather
than regulation, there is an exercise of the taxing power of the state."' 7' This
"primary purpose test" provides a more objective standard than simple
guesswork as to the subjective legislative intentions, since conflicting
legislative ends may be discounted in light of a principal taxing or regulatory
goal. In Besozzz, for example, the court based its holding on the conclusion
that
the primary purpose of the [Employment Security Act] is the accumulation
and distribution of funds, and not to police or regulate employment.
Therefore, in function the act is primarily the exercise of the taxing
authority rather than the police powers of the state, notwithstanding the
statement to the contrary contained within the preamble of the act.74
The holding in Besozzz follows the reasoning of earlier cases that struggled
to classify a statute as either punitive or revenue-raising. In Department of
Treasury v. Midwest Liquor Dealers,75 the Indiana Court of Appeals held
that "the taxing power is exercised for the sole purpose of raising revenue
while the police power can be exercised only for the purpose of promoting the
public welfare. 76 Similarly, the supreme court held in City of Terre Haute
v Kersey" that a tax assessed on the operation of vehicles on the streets of
Terre Haute, Indiana, according to the type of vehicle and the number of
horses pulling it, was a tax because the primary purpose was to provide
revenue for the maintenance and repair of the streets.7i
There are many indications that the Act is in fact a punitive measure. For
example, its entire taxation scheme applies only to those persons who possess
controlled substances illegally, excluding pharmacists and physicians who are
registered under Indiana law to possess or dispense controlled substances. 79
72. 146 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1957).
73. Id. at 105 (footnote omitted).
74. Id., see also Championship Wrestling, Inc. v. State Boxing Comm'n, 477 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1985) ("If the primary purpose of the tax is to raise revenue, it is a tax and not an exercise of
the police power to regulate.").
75. 48 N.E.2d 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943).
76. Id. at 73.
77. 64 N.E. 469 (Ind. 1902).
78. Id. at 471. As the Kersey court reasoned:
It is apparent that the ordinance neither professes nor is intended in any manner to regulate or
restrict the use of vehicles, but the primary purpose thereof is to impose a license tax as
revenue for the maintenance and repair of the streets. Therefore, appellant in the adoption
thereof, cannot be said to have been in the exercise of the police power, for the functions of
the latter are not primarily the raising of revenue. The authorities generally affirm that the
power to tax, in a strict and proper sense, for the purpose of creating revenue, is not included
within the police power of the state.
Id.
79. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-5. The Act excludes those persons registered under §§ 35-48-3-3 to -4
(1993). Section 35-48-3-9 provides that Schedule II, III, IV, and V drugs may be lawfully dispensed
only upon the prescription of a practitioner and filled by a pharmacy. Id. § 35-48-3-9 (1993).
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Moreover, felonious drug possessors face an additional Class D felony for
failure to pay the tax, but no such additional penalty is imposed upon
misdemeanor drug possessors.8" Therefore, it may be inferred that the
General Assembly intended to tax (or perhaps punish) only criminals, and to
burden felony drug possessors more heavily than misdemeanants. Moreover,
the Act contains a "reward provision," granting thirty percent of the "total
amount collected from an assessment to the law enforcement agency that
provided the information that resulted in the assessment."''8 Thus, the
assessment and levy of the tax are closely tied to the prosecution of
noncomplying taxpayers, a function of the state's police power. It can also be
argued that one of the Act's purposes is to encourage "bounty hunting" by
financially strapped law enforcement agencies. If true, this goal is principally
a function of the police power, which serves to "promot[e] the public
welfare"8 2 by providing an incentive to zealously enforce the laws.
If the Act is in fact a sincere effort to strengthen the revenue gathering
powers of the state, it must have a revenue raising "primary purpose. '83 The
most obvious evidence of this purpose is the wording of the statute itself. This
aspect alone, however, is insufficient evidence for one to conclude that the
Act's primary purpose is taxation. One must also consider what factors might
have convinced the General Assembly to enact a revenue measure taxing
controlled substances. In so doing, one may presume that the General
Assembly considered the financial results of drug tax measures implemented
by other states.
This presumption is bolstered by the contents of the Indiana Legislative
Services Agency's Fiscal Impact Statement-which was prepared in
anticipation of the legislature's vote on the Act. The Fiscal Impact Statement
informed the legislators that "[a]nnual revenues [in other states having drug
taxes] vary from nothing in a few states to approximately $300,000 in
Minnesota. With few exceptions, collections result from seizure of assets upon
arrest of possessors of illegal substances."8 4 More precisely, in fiscal year
1991, the year of the Fiscal Impact Statement, Minnesota's Department of
Revenue collected $340,918 under its drug tax statute. 5 This figure,
however, does not tell the entire story In order to collect the $340,918, the
State of Minnesota was forced to impose tax liabilities in excess of $1.8
million.8 6 Moreover, for the five-year period between 1987 and the first
portion of 1992, the Minnesota Department of Revenue assessed $32,951,655
in taxes only to collect $1,791,506.87 Thus, Minnesota collected only 5.5%
80. Id. § 6-7-3-I 1(b).
81. Id. § 6-7-3-16(b) (1993).
82. Besozzi v. Indiana Employment Sec. Bd., 146 N.E.2d 100, 104-05 (Ind. 1957).
83. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
84. Omc OF FISCAL AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, LEGIS.ATIVE SERvs. AGENCY, FISCAL IMPACr
STATEMENT LS 6421, at 2 (1991) [hereinafter FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT].
85. Christina Joyce, Expanding the War Against Drugs: Taxing Marijuana and Controlled
Substances, 12 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 231, 237 (1991).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 242.
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of the taxes it initially assessed. 8 The poor collection percentage was
attributable to the failure of criminals to voluntarily pay the taxes as well as
the fact that no stamps were sold since the second year of the law's
enactment.89 If Minnesota's experience is a drug tax success story worth
emulating, then revenue-raising was not the primary purpose of the General
Assembly
Collection difficulties with respect drug taxes are not uncommon:
Said a Maine official: "We do a fair amount of assessing, but very little
collecting." In Arizona, which has a number of Latin Americans running
drugs across its borders, officials face the difficult job of enforcing tax
penalties on non-U.S. citizens. Minnesota Revenue officials estimate that
from half to two-thirds of all drug arrests in Minnesota involve drug
quantities too small to merit their interest. Furthermore, states cannot
expect drug tax collections to happen overnight. According to one
Minnesota official, "making an assessment is one thing; collecting is
another thing. But if [law enforcement agencies] choose not to inform us,
it's detrimental to the state because we have no opportunity to [make] a
collection."90
Thus, the evidence before the General Assembly could not have led a rational
legislator to conclude that the Controlled Substance Excise Tax would raise
money for the state.
While the Act has only been in effect since July, 1992, the results thus far
indicate that Indiana is having no more success than other states. According
to the Indiana Department of Revenue's 1994 Annual Report, the state raised
just $260,000 under the Act in Fiscal Year 1994-a twenty percent decrease
from 1993, the first year of collection.9' This figure gains more significance
when compared with the state's other sources of tax revenue. For example, the
state raised over $114 million in taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco
products, and nearly $34 million on alcoholic beverage taxes. Thus, these
other "sin taxes" are much more financially rewarding to the state.92 While
not essential to the foundation of this Note, these figures serve to demonstrate
how little revenue the Act actually raises for the State of Indiana.
Why, then, did the Indiana General Assembly pass the Controlled Substance
Excise Tax? The cynical response is that the General Assembly applied "'the
Al Capone theory of law enforcement: Officials and legislators were certain
no one would actually [pay the drug tax], and thus they could be prosecuted
not only for having the drugs, but also for tax evasion. In addition, the state
could collect the tax and a 100 percent penalty ,,93 The more honest answer
to this question is that no one except the individual legislators who voted
knows why the statute was enacted. While the bulk of the evidence indicates
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 241 (alterations in orginal) (citations omitted).
91. INDIANA DEP'T OF REvENuE, ANN. REP. 24 (1994).
92. Id. at 24-25.
93. Joyce, supra note 85, at 240 (alteration added) (quoting MiNN-APOLiS STAR & TRm., Oct. 17,
1986, at IB).
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that the Act was designed to punish those who illegally possess controlled
substances-and that even if the Act is truly a revenue raising measure, it is
at best an effort that will have much more success on paper than in the
treasury 9 4 -the absence of any meaningful legislative history in Indiana
erects a wall against a more probing inquiry into the primary purpose of the
legislature. Therefore, this Note will leave it to the reader to draw his own
informed conclusions based on the available evidence, and then it will proceed
with two separate lines of analysis. The first gives the legislature the benefit
of the doubt and analyzes the Act's constitutionality based on the underlying
assumption that the Act is truly a tax. The other line of reasoning discounts
the stated purpose of the Act and examines it as a punitive measure.
III. ANALYZING THE ACT AS A TRUE TAx
Two challenges to the constitutionality of the Act operate on the assumption
that the General Assembly's labels are genuine (or at least deserving of the
benefit of the doubt) and that the Controlled Substance Excise Tax is truly a
tax measure. Despite this sincerity in classification, analysis of the Act in
light of both the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution leads
to the conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional.
A. Challenges Based on Self-Incriminaton
Under the Act (and in certain cases the Internal Revenue Code),95 a
possessor of a controlled substance is compelled to provide the government
with potentially incriminating evidence that could be used if the state wishes
to prosecute the taxpayer for drug-related crimes. Thus, compliance with the
Act compels self-incriminating testimony in violation of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Indiana
Constitution.96
94. It should be noted, however, that an ill-conceived statute is not necessarily an unconstitutional
one. Just because a revenue raising measure will not, m fact, raise revenue, is not a matter for the courts
to consider in constitutional analysis. See Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721,726 (Ind. 1962) ("We have
no right to go into the merits of the proposed tax. Whether an Act is wise or expedient is a matter for
the legislature--not the courts. Those matters have no bearing on the constitutionality of the
legislation.'); see also Taxpayers Lobby v. Orr, 311 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Ind. 1974); Championship
Wrestling, Inc. v. State Boxing Comm'n, 477 N.E.2d 302, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
95. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 60501 (Supp. 1993).
96. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), resolution
of state constitutional issues by state courts must be clearly delineated from federal issues:
[When] a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most
reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
that federal law required it to do so.
Id. at 1040-41. To provide a similar distinction between state and federal law, this Note will cite to state
cases primarily in support of state constitutional arguments, with explanatory parentheticals in the
footnotes to explain substantive differences between state and federal constitutional law where
appropriate.
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The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."97 Article
I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution similarly states that "[n]o person, in
any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.""8
These proscriptions against requiring a defendant to testify or be a witness
against himself form the constitutional protection against compelled self-
incrimination. This right is a limited one and protects a citizen only against
compulsion to provide "testimony "'' Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States0 0 defined "testimony" broadly
enough to include, in some cases, the payment of a tax on illegal activities.
To determine whether the payment of a tax constitutes giving self-
incriminating evidence or testimony, Indiana courts must follow the four-part
"Marchetti test." If the taxpayer challenging the statute meets his burdens
under all four prongs of the test, the claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination will constitute a complete defense to a failure to pay a tax. 10'
First, a court must consider whether the tax is aimed at individuals
"'inherently suspect of criminal activities.""01 2 Second, the court must
further determine whether the taxed activity is in "'an area permeated with
criminal statutes.""0 3 Third, Marchetti applies only to cases in which the
taxpayer is "required, on pain of criminal prosecution, to provide information
which the individual might reasonably suppose would be available to
prosecuting authorities.' 0 4 Finally, the Marchetti test looks to whether such
information "would surely prove a significant 'link in a chain' of evidence
tending to establish [the defendant's] guilt."' Only if all of these burdens
are met will a taxpayer succeed in showing that a statute compels self-
incrimination.
Looking at the first requirement, Indiana's tax is aimed squarely at those in
possession of controlled substances. As the Act states, "The tax imposed
under this chapter is due when the person receives delivery of, takes
possession of, or manufactures a controlled substance in violation of I.C.
§ 35-48-4 or 21 U.S.C. 841 through 21 U.S.C. 852.' ' 6 The Act indicates
that it is targeted solely at illegal possessors in two separate respects. First,
the tax is imposed only on one who possesses controlled substances in
violation of criminal drug laws.'0 7 Second, the tax specifically exempts
97. U.S. CONST. amend. V
98. IND. CONST. art. I, § 14.
99. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (adopting a two-part test for self-
icnmmination analysis: whether the evidence is (1) testimony, and (2) has a communicative aspect); see
also Allen v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ind. 1981) (recognizing that in Indiana, defendants are
likewise protected only from "testimonial compulsion").
100. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
101. Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 47 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)).
103. Id. (quoting Albertson, 302 U.S. at 79).
104. Id. at 48.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-8.
107. Id.
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pharmacists and other professionals who are legally permitted to possess and
dispense the drugs in question.'"8 Such an exception influenced the Leary
Court, which noted that certain groups statutorily authorized to possess
controlled substances "appear to be wholly exempt from the transfer tax
requirements." 9 Similar exclusionary language contributed to the finding
of unconstitutionality in State v. Roberts,"0 in which the Supreme Court of
South Dakota struck down that state's drug tax on self-incrimination grounds.
As the Roberts court wrote:
We also note the alleged purpose of Chapter 10-50A is to tax and
license trade in illicit controlled substances. Under SDCL 10-50A-8, those
lawfully in possession of controlled substances are exempted from the tax
and licensure provisions of the chapter. Additionally, the marijuana and
controlled substances subject to taxation are only those substances illegally
held. There is no doubt the chapter is directed towards a "select group
inherently suspect of criminal activities.. ' .
Like the South Dakota Act, Indiana's Act is squarely aimed at individuals
inherently suspected of criminal activities: in fact it applies only to such
persons.
With respect to the second prong-whether the taxed area is thoroughly
permeated with criminal statutes-the possession and trafficking of controlled
substances are areas thoroughly permeated with criminal statutes on both the
state and federal level. Courts applying this prong of the Marchetti test agree
that the state and federal criminal codes are thoroughly permeated with drug
laws. In Leary, for example, the Court noted that "possession of any quantity
of marihuana was apparently a crime in every one of the 50 States, including
New York, where Petitioner claimed the transfer occurred, and Texas, where
he was arrested and convicted."".. The Indiana Criminal Code devotes an
entire Article to crimes involving the possession, manufacture, and distribu-
tion of controlled substances." 3 Likewise, the United States Code contains
many statutes outlawing the same drug-related conduct.' Because of the
breadth and depth of drug regulation, it is safe to say that the possession,
manufacture, and distribution of controlled substances are areas so thoroughly
permeated with criminal statutes as to meet the burden imposed by Marchetti.
Whether Indiana's statute meets the third and fourth prongs of the Marchetti
test is less obvious. Marchetti recognizes compelled self-incrimination only
when a taxpayer must provide information which the individual "might
reasonably suppose would be available to prosecuting authorities.""5 The
108. Id. § 6-7-3-5.
109. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18 (1969).
110. 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986).
111. Id. at 691 (quoting Leary, 395 U.S. at 18) (citations omitted).
112. Leary, 395 U.S. at 16 n.15.
113. Article 48 of Title 35 of the Indiana Code consists of six chapters of the Indiana Criminal Code
and is devoted solely to controlled substances. See IND. CODE §§ 35-48-1-1 to -6-15 (1993 & Supp.
1994).
114. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-852 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
115. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
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information must "surely prove a significant 'link in a chain' of evidence
tending to establish [the defendant's] guilt." 6 The Controlled Substance
Excise Tax, however, purports to maintain the taxpayer's confidentiality
Under the Act, "[a] person may not be required to reveal the person's identity
at the time the tax is paid."'"7 Additionally, "confidential information
acquired by the department [of revenue] may not be used to initiate or
facilitate prosecution for an offense other than an offense based on a violation
of [the Act]."
The Act, however, fails to define the "confidential information" that may
not be used to initiate or facilitate prosecution. Such information may include
the taxpayer's name, address, or physical description-which is especially
relevant if the tax is paid in person. Although this information does not
appear confidential as that term is commonly understood, such knowledge
about one who has just paid the Controlled Substance Excise Tax can be
highly incriminating. Without more explicit limitations on precisely what
types of information are confidential, and thus nondisclosable, the statute's
ambiguity does not sufficiently prevent incriminating information from being
disclosed to law enforcement agencies. The additional statutory provisions
found elsewhere in the Indiana tax code" 9 purport to provide taxpayers with
additional protection. Specifically, section 6-8.1-7-1 provides:
(a) Unless in accordance with a judicial order or as otherwise provided in
this chapter, the department, its employees, former employees, counsel,
agents, or any other person may not divulge the amount of tax paid by any
taxpayer, terms of a settlement agreement executed between a taxpayer and
the department, investigation records, investigation reports, or any other
information disclosed by the reports filed under the provisions of the law
relating to any of the listed taxes, including required information derived
from a federal return, except to:
(1) members and employees of the department;
(2) the governor;
(3) the attorney general or any other legal representative of the state in any
action in respect to the amount of tax due under the provisions of the law
relating to any of the listed taxes; or
(4) any authorized officers of the United States; when it is agreed that the
information is to be confidential and to be used solely for official
purposes. 2 °
Additionally, the Code makes violation of the above statute a Class C
misdemeanor. 121
The statutory protections, however, are largely illusory in this case. The
above quoted language contains enough loopholes to render its protections
meaningless. The first phrase of the statute, "unless in accordance with a
judicial order or as otherwise provided in this chapter," allows two situations
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-8.
118. Id. § 6-7-3-9.
119. Id. § 6-8.1-7-1 (Supp. 1994).
120. Id..
121. Id. § 6-8.1-7-3 (1993).
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where the protection against self-incrimination may be compromised. First, a
judge may order tax information disclosed, with no limitation on the type of
disclosure ordered. Additionally, "as otherwise provided in this chapter" may
be construed to defer to section 6-7-3-9 of the Code, which allows non-
confidential information (which has not been defined) to be disclosed to law
enforcement officials. This section also allows disclosure to "any authorized
officers of the United States." Such officers, who are not described in the
statute, may include United States attorneys or agents of the FBI or DEA.
Moreover, "official purposes" can easily be read to include non-tax related
criminal prosecution on state and/or federal drug charges.
The Act's provision that "[a] person may not be required to reveal the
person's identity at the time the tax is paid"' does not adequately protect
the taxpayer from forced self-incrimination. Other statutory schemes which
essentially amounted to mandatory registration of those committing illegal acts
have been struck down despite similar attempts at saving language. In
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 3 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the statutory language preventing an individual's registration as a
Communist from being "'received in evidence against such person in any
prosecution for any alleged violation of any . criminal statute"' was an
insufficient protection of the individual's rights against compelled self-
incrimination.'2 4 As the Albertson Court observed, "'[N]o [immunity] statute
which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
crimmating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the [self-
incrimination] privilege.""' 125 An immunity provision "is valid only if it
supplies 'a complete protection from all the perils against which the
constitutional prohibition was designed to guard' by affording 'absolute
immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question
relates.""' 2 6 Simply put, an immunity provision is inadequate if it does not
provide complete protection to the taxpayer's anonymity
More recently, South Dakota's controlled substance tax was struck down on
self-incrimination grounds in State v. Roberts.1' The South Dakota statutory
scheme at issue in Roberts, while specifically allowing for disclosure of tax
return information to law enforcement officials (unlike Indiana's statute),
attempted to provide saving language against self-incrimination under the drug
tax provision. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the State's provision that
nontax-related "' [criminal] prosecution may not, however, be initiated or
facilitated by the disclosure of confidential information in violation of [the
provision detailing prescribed disclosure],"' was insufficient to protect
122. Id. § 6-7-3-8.
123. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
124. Id. at 79-80 n.10 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 783(0 (1964)).
125. Albertson, 382 U.S. at 80 (first alteration in original) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892)).
126. Id. (quoting Hitchcock, 142 U.S. at 585-86).
127. 384 N.W.2d 688 (S.D. 1986).
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taxpayers' rights. 2 ' This language is very similar to the Indiana Act's
purportedly protective language. 129 The Roberts court held that "prosecution
may be initiated by those officials based upon return information, even though
[the statute] purports to eliminate just such an occurrence. We believe filing
a return creates the 'real and appreciable' risk of self-incrimination prohibited
by Leary "130
Roberts is arguably distinguishable in that the South Dakota statute
specifically allows the release of tax information to law enforcement
agencies.' 3' This argument, however, overlooks the fact that Indiana's
statutory section preventing disclosure of "confidential information" fails to
define the term "confidential." Moreover, by restricting access to "confiden-
tial" information, the Act implicitly allows disclosure of "non-confidential"
information. Without a definition to enable officials to determine whether
information is confidential (and thus nondisclosable), incriminating informa-
tion may conceivably be provided to law enforcement authorities under the
seemingly innocuous guise of "non-confidential" information. Finally,
Indiana's Code does allow disclosure of certain information to various
officials who are in charge of criminal prosecutions and investigations. The
protective language in the statutes addressed in Albertson and Smith did not
save them from unconstitutionality Thus, the real risk of self-incrimination
leading to the decision in Roberts is equally present in the context of the
Indiana Act, despite the statutory barriers erected by the legislature.
Nevertheless, some state courts have found sufficient protection in their own
statutes. In State v. Durrant,13 2 the Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that "the
challenged Kansas statutes prohibit public employees from disclosing any
information required under the act and prohibit the use of such information
in a criminal proceeding, except to enforce the tax itself." 33 Thus, the
128. Id. at 690 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-50A-7 (repealed 1987)).
129. The Act reads as follows: "[Clonfidential information acquired by the department [of revenue]
may not be used to initiate or facilitate prosecution for an offense other than an offense based on a
violation of this chapter." IND. CODE § 6-7-3-9.
130. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d at 691 (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18 (1969)).
131. The provision states:
Returns and return information may be disclosed to the following:
(5) Officers, employees or legal representatives of any other state agency or department or
political subdivision of the state for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity, if the head
of the agency, department or political subdivision desiring such information has made a written
request to the secretary specifying the particular information desired and the law enforcement
activity for which the information is sought.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-1-28.4(5) (1989). This disclosure provision is slightly more generous
than Indiana's.
132. 769 P.2d 1174 (Kan.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 923 (1989).
133. Id. at 1180. The protective language of the Kansas statute reads:
(a) Except as otherwise more specifically provided by law, all information received by the
director of taxation from applications for licensure or registration made or returns or reports
filed under the provisions of any law imposing any excise tax administered by the director, or
from any investigation conducted under such provisions, shall be confidential, and it shall be
unlawful for any officer or employee of the department of revenue to divulge any such
information except in accordance with other provisions of law respecting the enforcement and
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Durrant court interpreted and approved of a stricter confidentiality provision
than that found in Indiana's Act. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled in Sisson v. Triplett3 4 that a statute protecting the confidentiality of
a drug taxpayer's identity was sufficient to overcome a self-incrimination
challenge. The Sisson court held that the Minnesota statute (which is also
stricter than Indiana's) sufficiently protected the taxpayer's confiden-
tiality 135 Accordingly, the fact that these courts found no self-incrimination
flaws in their own statutes does not lend support to Indiana's weaker non-
disclosure provisions.
The focal point of Marchetti's reasoning, and the purpose of the four-point
test, is to determine whether a tax law creates a real and substantial risk of
self-incrimination. 136 Marchetti simply focuses on the taxpayer's reasonably
founded fear of self-incrimination. This risk, if present, would arise when the
taxpayer attempts to comply with the Act. The Act provides no specific
guidance about how the tax must be paid, or by whom it must be paid.
If a taxpayer pays the tax by mail, the Department of Revenue must mail
the receipt. Providing the Department of Revenue with a return address forces
a taxpayer to disclose his identity, eliminating any chance of taxpayer
anonymity Still another obstacle facing payment by mail is that it will almost
certainly not be in cash. Rather, the mailed payment will likely be a personal
check, cashier's check, or money order. All three methods provide information
about the payor's identity despite the Act's stipulation that the taxpayer need
not provide identifying information. Finally, the excise tax is due when the
taxpayer takes delivery of a controlled substance.'37 The tax receipt given
to the taxpayer is valid for only forty-eight hours. 3 ' Thus, if payment of the
tax is made by mail, the best-case scenario is that payment will be sent in
collection of such tax, in accordance with proper judicial order and as provided in K.S.A. 74-
2424, and amendments thereto.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-5210 (1988).
134. 428 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1988).
135. Id. The Sisson court interpreted a 1986 statute which provided for more protection than
Indiana's Act. However, Minnesota has since gone further, enacting a stronger confidentiality provision
in 1987 that reads:
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, neither the commissioner nor a public employee may
reveal facts contained in a report or return required by this chapter or any information obtained
from a tax obligor, nor can any information contained in such a report or return or obtained
from a tax obligor be used against the tax obligor in any criminal proceeding, unless
independently obtained, except in connection with a proceeding involving taxes due under this
chapter from the tax obligor making this return.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297D.13 (1) (West 1991).
Texas has a similar provision, which was approved in Lopez v. State, 837 S.W.2d 863 (lex. Ct. App.
1992). The Texas provision, like that of Minnesota, declares information provided by a taxpayer to be
confidential, and forbids disclosure for any purpose other than tax proceedings. The Texas statute also
restricts the use of such information in other proceedings unless it is independently obtained. TEx. TAX
CODE ANN. § 159.005 (West 1992).
136. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). The Marchetti Court held that "[t]he central
standard for the pnvilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and
'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id. (citations omitted).
137. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-8.
138. Id. § 6-7-3-10(b).
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anticipation of receipt of the controlled substance so that the payment will
reach the state when due, if not sooner. The state then mails the receipt to the
taxpayer, reaching the taxpayer no sooner than the day after payment is
recorded. Thus, the forty-eight-hour validity period is reduced by one-half
before the taxpayer receives evidence of payment.
If the taxpayer elects to pay the tax in person, the excise statute still creates
a risk of self-incrimination. One who pays in person but seeks to protect his
anonymity will almost certainly pay in cash, which provides no information
about the payor and is untraceable. This cash payment will likely require the
taxpayer to divulge his identity and significant personal information to the
state by virtue of his appearance at a government office for the sole purpose
of declaring publicly that he owes a tax on controlled substances that he
illegally possesses or sells.
Moreover, the cash payment of a tax as costly as the Controlled Substance
Excise Tax may compel the taxpayer to incriminate himself in a potential
federal prosecution. The Indiana Department of Revenue may be subject to a
federal tax statute requiring "any person who is engaged in a trade or
business, and who, in the course of such trade or business, receives more
than $10,000 in cash in 1 transaction (or 2 or more related transactions)" to
file an information return (IRS Form 8300) with the Internal Revenue
Service.'39 Form 8300 requires significant personal information about the
taxpayer, including name, address, and social security number. Given the high
rate of taxation on controlled substances, the cash tax payments will very
likely be in excess of $10,000, thereby triggering the Form 8300 filing
requirement.
140
Recently, in United States v. Ritchie'41 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a self-incrimination claim based on the compulsion to submit a
Form 8300 for the payment of a large legal fee in cash. Although the court
denied the self-incrimination claim, it left open the possibility that the filing
of a Form 8300 could be the source of compelled self-incrimination in other
cases. 4 2 As the court explained, "[T]he information required must be
incriminating or integrally linked with behavior deemed offensive in order for
the Fifth Amendment to be implicated; paying one's attorney in cash does not
fall within this category ""' Therefore, if a cash transaction integrally
linked with offensive behavior required the submission of a Form 8300, the
taxpayer's right against self-incrimination might be in danger. The cash
payment of the Controlled Substance Excise Tax provides just such a
scenario-the information on a Form 8300 filed by one paying the tax in cash
is integrally linked to the illegal possession of controlled substances.
The question remains whether the Indiana Department of Revenue is
required to file a Form 8300 when receiving Controlled Substance Excise Tax
139. 26 U.S.C. § 60501.
140. For example, the tax on 250 grams of marijuana (approximately one-half pound) is $10,000.
141. 15 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 115 S. Ct. 188 (1994).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
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payments. The phrase "person who is engaged in a trade or business" is
vague. The term "person" may include governmental entities such as the
Indiana Department of Revenue. A state department of revenue is, in fact,
engaged in a trade or business: the assessment, collection, and distribution of
state taxes. Section 60501 does not define the term "person." This omission
is most likely the result of legislative oversight since other related sections
define "person" for purposes of those sections. Those definitions vary as to
whether a governmental entity is actually a person.
14
Once the IRS receives this information, it is statutorily authorized to
disclose it to federal law enforcement agencies under certain circum-
stances.1 45 As the Internal Revenue Code provides:
[A]ny return or return information [including taxpayer identity] shall,
pursuant to and upon the grant of an ex parte order by a Federal district
court judge or magistrate be open (but only to the extent necessary as
provided in such order) to inspection by, or disclosure to, officers and
employees of any Federal agency who are personally and directly engaged
in
(i) preparation for any judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining to
the enforcement of a specially designated Federal criminal statute (not
involving tax administration) to which the United States or such agency is
or may be a party,
(ii) any investigation which may result in such a proceeding, or
(iii) any Federal grand jury proceeding pertaining to enforcement of such
a criminal statute to which the United States or such agency is or may be
a party,
solely for the use of such officers and employees in such preparation,
investigation, or grand jury proceeding.' 46
Thus, agencies such as the FBI or the DEA could petition a federal judge
for access to Forms 8300 filed by the Indiana Department of Revenue in
payment of the Controlled Substance Excise Tax, and thereby receive the
names of the individual taxpayers as a rbsult of the taxpayers' forced
compliance with the Controlled Substance Excise Tax. As a result, a taxpayer
who is required to pay a tax in excess of $10,000 is exposing himself to a real
and substantial risk of providing self-incriminating evidence that may be used
in a federal criminal drug prosecution. A Form 8300 detailing an individual's
payment of the Controlled Substance Excise Tax would provide evidence of
a taxpayer's guilt equal, for all practical purposes, to a forced confession.
Moreover, the possibility that even a cash payment could compel the
disclosure of self-incriminating testimony is a real and appreciable risk of
self-incrimination.
By complying with the Controlled Substance Excise Tax, a taxpayer is
subjected to a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination. Compelling
144. Compare 26 U.S.C. §§ 6049(b)(4), 6050J(d) (1988) (including governmental entities as
"persons') with id. §§ 6050B(b), 6050D(c) (1988) (limiting "person" to specific individuals forpurposes
of the particular section).
145. Id. § 6103(i)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
146. Id.
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payment of this tax in the face of inadequate protections against self-
incrimination is tantamount to extracting a forced confession. The possessor
of a controlled substance is compelled to admit his or her guilt every forty-
eight hours. Such "testimony" is one of the most self-incriminating types
imaginable and would surely establish a "significant link in a chain of
evidence" that would establish a taxpayer's guilt under Marchetti. Moreover,
the evidence would meet the Supreme Court's test from Schmerber v
California'47 for determining whether evidence is subject to a self-incrimina-
tion challenge by virtue of its testimonial and communicative nature.
Therefore, the Act is unconstitutional because it forces the taxpayer to provide
potentially self-incriminating evidence to the government.
B. Article X, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution
[T]he Indiana Constitution provides a great variety of protections for
citizens which are not contained in the Federal Bill of Rights. Aside from
the ability to submit a claim that Indiana's provisions provide greater
protection, there are a great many parts of Indiana's Bill of Rights which
simply have no federal counterpart.
48
Although the above quoted language is directed toward the Indiana Bill of
Rights, its author, the current Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court,
specifically reminded the legal community that there exist throughout the
Indiana Constitution rights and safeguards not present in the United States
Constitution.
49
One such right is found in Article X, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution,
which requires that "[t]he General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a
uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation and shall prescribe
regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and
personal."' This equal assessment requirement is, however, limited to
property taxes under the general levy "' Thus, if the Controlled Substance
Excise Tax is not a property tax under the state's general levy, the limitations
found in Article X, section 1 are irrelevant.
147. 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see also supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
148. Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. R.Ev. 575, 580
(1989).
149. Id. at 580 n.37.
150. IND. CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
151. Benner-Coryell Lumber Co. v. Indiana Unemployment Compensation Bd., 29 N.E.2d 776 (Ind.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 698 (1941); Miles v. Dep't of Treasury, 199 N.E. 372 (Ind. 1935), appeal
dismissed, 298 U.S. 640 (1936).
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1. Is the Act an Excise Tax?
Obviously, the Controlled Substance Excise Tax has been labeled an "excise
tax." The labels affixed by the state legislature, however, are not necessarily
dispositive of a law's true nature. "[T]he nature of the tax must be determined
by its operation and incidence, rather than by its title or designation made by
the legislature. In other words, the legislature may not change a factual
situation by giving it a different name or designation."152 An excise tax is
"one which is imposed upon the exercise of a privilege or use within the
state." 53 Additionally, to qualify as an excise tax, the Act "must be so
because the tax is imposed against the person because of privileges enjoyed
and not against the property of the taxpayer."' I54 Privileges and uses found
to be permissibly taxed as excise include the use of the public highways,1 5
the right to sell intoxicating liquors, 56 the right to enter "a particular
business or calling, or as a license on particular pursuits, or as a mere police
regulation,"'5 7 and the right to record mortgages.'58 These and other state
excise tax statutes are all similar in that payment of the tax confers the right
to enjoy a privilege on the taxpayer.'59
Unlike the excise taxes discussed above, payment of the Controlled
Substance Excise Tax confers no right or privilege on the taxpayer. The
payment of this tax, assessed on the possession, delivery, and manufacture of
controlled substances, does not allow the taxpayer to conduct these activities
with impunity. Rather, the Act explicitly states that payment of the tax does
not give the taxpayer the privilege of possessing, delivering, or manufacturing
controlled substances.
61
Nevertheless, Article X, section 1 is limited to property taxes under the
general levy 161 Courts have interpreted this limitation to mean that "this
section of our fundamental law relates to a general assessment of taxes on
property according to its value."' 62 Under the Act, the tax is not assessed
on an activity, but rather on the controlled substance by its weight. For
controlled substances, assessment by weight is the same as assessment by
152. Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721, 723 (Ind. 1962).
153. Id.
154. Lutz v. Arnold, 193 N.E. 840, 844 (Ind. 1935).
155. City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 64 N.E. 469, 471 (Ind. 1902).
156. Fry v. Rosen, 189 N.E. 375 (Ind.), appeal dismissed, 293 U.S. 526 (1934).
157. Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223, 232 (1866).
158. 1933 Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 20.
159. See, e.g., Village of Lombard v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 90 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. 1950) (holding that
excise taxes arise from a privilege associated with the use of property, while property taxes arise from
the property itself); Herman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 55 A.2d 491 (Md. 1947) (holding
that excise taxes are taxes paid on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities, and corporate
privileges); Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co. v. Porterfield, 324 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that an excise tax is one imposed upon the performance of an act, the engaging in of an
occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege).
160. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-9.
161. Miles v. Dep't of Treasury, 199 N.E. 372, 374 (Ind. 1935), appeal dismissed, 298 U.S. 640
(1936).
162. City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 64 N.E. 469, 472 (nd. 1902).
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value, since the substances are sold and valued in their applicable market by
weight (the "street value").'6 3 Indeed, the taxpayer need not use or transfer
controlled substances to be taxed on them. The Act does not look solely to
use or enjoyment of the illegal drugs. Rather, the statute specifically taxes
"controlled substances that are possessed in Indiana."' 164 Possession
of the drugs, rather than use, is sufficient for a taxpayer to be subject to the
tax. This leads to the conclusion that the drugs themselves (property) are
being taxed, not the use or enjoyment thereof (excise). Consequently, the Act
must be read as a tax on property, rather than an excise tax on the exercise
of a right or privilege.
2. Application of Article X, Section 1
If Article X, section 1 governs the Act's constitutionality, that section must
be applied to determine whether the Controlled Substance Excise Tax provides
for a uniform and equal rate of taxation and a just valuation for taxation.
These constitutional requirements are strictly enforced by the courts.
165
Cases interpreting Article X, section 1 have developed several principles to
guide the construction of this provision. These principles are: "(1) Uniformity
and equality in assessment; (2) uniformity and equality as to rate of taxation;
and (3) a just valuation for taxation. Each of these propositions are inter-
locking and mandatory. They are the constitutional basis of a valid tax
law 166 Therefore, the absence of any of these three requirements should
render a statute unconstitutional. Moreover, the legislature itself has decreed
that "[a]ll tangible property which is subject to assessment shall be assessed
on a just valuation basis and in a uniform and equal manner."'' 67
The Act provides for no valuation; no reference whatever is made to the
value of the controlled substances taxed, nor to a formula for taxation based
on such a valuation. Rather, the arbitrary scale taxing the substances by
weight from $10-$40 per gram has been promulgated by the state with no
explanation or justification for this scheme. 68 Even assuming that there
were a valuation for tax purposes, the Act does not provide a just valuation
or assessment. 69 Indiana courts have held that "[t]here is uniformity and
equality of assessment and taxation when all the property is to be assessed at
its true cash value, and the same rate is fixed on all the property subject to
163. Don J. DeBenedictis, How Long Is Too Long?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 74, 76.
164. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-5. This Note will not venture into the debate as to whether, or to what
degree, possession constitutes conduct for criminal purposes.
165. Article X, section 1 ."mandate[s] Indiana to maintain igid requirements of equality in
taxing property."' Bielski v. Zorn, 627 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Ind. Tax 1994) (omission in original) (quoting
Indiana Aeronautics Comm'n v. Ambassadair, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 (Ind. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 905 (1978)).
166. Id. at 884 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
167. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-2-2 (1993).
168. See id. § 6-7-3-6.
169. The cases of Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721 (Ind. 1962), and Finney v. Johnson, 179 N.E.2d
718 (Ind. 1962), added the requirement that both the valuation and assessment of property must be just
for a tax measure to survive scrutiny under Article X, section 1.
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assessment for the tax."' 0 However, even a tax assessment based on the
cost of taxed property does not satisfy the constitutional requirements unless
it "move[s] towards the goal of securing a just valuation of all property on the
principles of uniformity and equality."' 7 '
The taxes imposed under the Act far exceed any notion of fair or just
taxation on property in relation to what a taxpayer would pay to acquire
controlled substances. For example, marijuana (a Schedule I controlled
substance), "'7 2 is taxed at $40 per gram. The estimated 1993 "street" value
for marijuana in Indianapolis, Indiana, was $3-$6 per gram.'7 Other
substances taxed by the Act are also taxed at or above their actual street
values, and certainly in excess of any just assessment. For example, cocaine
(a Schedule II drug) 74 and heroin (a Schedule I drug),' each having a
per gram "street value" of between $30 and $50, 17 are taxed at $40 per
gram. 
77
Additionally, there is more to a just assessment than the stated amount of
tax. Frequency of payment should also be considered in determining fairness.
The receipt for payment under the Act is valid for a mere forty-eight hours.
No other type of property is taxed so excessively, or so frequently As a
comparison, it is worth noting that few other states have drug taxes as
financially severe as those listed in Indiana's Act.17 ' The typical tax rate for
marijuana is $3.50 per gram, and many statutes provide thresholds for weight
of the substance possessed, below which the tax is not assessed.
7 9
It is safe to conclude that taxes in excess of the value of the taxed property,
due every forty-eight hours, and having no actual relation to the value of the
property, must violate a constitutional requirement calling for fair valuation
and assessment. As a result, the Controlled Substance Excise Tax, which in
170. Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Lyon & Greenleaf Co., 359 N.E.2d 931, 933 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1977); see also Conter v. Commercial Bank of Crown Point, Ind., 199 N.E. 567 (Ind. 1936)
(holding that Article X, section I implies that the basis for taxation shall be valuation); Davis v. Sexton,
200 N.E.2d 233, 243 (Ind. 1936) ("The provision of [Article X, section 1] is complied with when all
property is assessed at its true cash value and at the same rate; there is then uniformity and equality of
assessment and taxation. Our tax system here involved is based upon the true cash value of all
property."). But see Indiana Dep't of State Revenue v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 143 N.E.2d 91 (Ind.
1957) (holding that the Federal Constitution does not demand that states equate tax to property value),
appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 607 (1958).
171. Lyon & Greenleaf, 359 N.E.2d at 934.
172. IND. CODE § 35-48-2-4(d)(14) (Supp. 1994).
173. DeBenedictis, supra note 163, at 76.
174. IND. CODE § 35-48-2-6(b)(4) (1993).
175. Id. § 35-48-2-4(c) (Supp. 1994).
176. DeBenedictis, supra note 163, at 76.
177. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-6(a)(1) (1993).
178. Of the 23 state drug tax laws surveyed in a recent study, 15 taxed marijuana at $3.50 for each
gram above a threshold level ranging from 28 to 42.5 grams. It is noteworthy, however, that Indiana's
tax rate on other controlled substances is much lower than those in most states. While Indiana taxes
Schedule I substances such as heroin at the same $40 per gram rate as marijuana, most states surveyed
taxed nonmarijuana "controlled substances" as high as $250 or $300 per gram. Ann L. Iijima, The War
on Drugs: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Falls Victim to State Taxation of Controlled
Substances, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 101, 137-39 (1994).
179. Id.
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fact taxes property and not excise, violates Article X, section 1 of the Indiana
Constitution.
IV CONSTRUING THE ACT AS A DISGUISED PENALTY'
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
If the Controlled Substance Excise Tax is not in fact a tax, then it may be
a "civil sanction" imposed only attendant to a conviction of the underlying
drug offense. If so, the sanction violates a taxpayer's double jeopardy rights.
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall
"be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."'8 Similarly, the Indiana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. '" '81
Double jeopardy applies when the State attempts to prosecute or punish a
defendant twice for the same offense." 2 Although the Act itself does not
impose a criminal sanction, it does provide for a civil sanction which
penalizes the taxpayer for possessing a controlled substance. While the tax is
not a criminal penalty per se, double jeopardy may still apply if the civil
sanction is disproportionately large and serves no remedial purpose that is
linked to the costs of law enforcement.
A. Foundations for Double Jeopardy Reasoning:
United States v Halper
In United States v Halper,83 the Supreme Court applied the Double
Jeopardy Clause to a civil sanction. The defendant in Halper was sentenced
to prison and fined $5000 for submitting false Medicare claims.'84 The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government in its civil suit
under the federal civil False Claims Act.i"5 The civil remedy exceeded
$130,000, compared to the Government's $16,000 actual loss in bringing the
case.8 6 The Supreme Court held that the statutory penalty of the False
Claims Act, as applied to Halper, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.ii
7
The Government argued that Halper's claims were meritless based on prior
Supreme Court holdings that no civil penalty may give rise to double
jeopardy "' Specifically, the Government argued that cases such as
180. U.S. CONST. amend. V
181. IND. CONST. art. I, § 14.
182. "[T]he [Federal Constitution's] Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses:
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,440
(1989).
183. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
184. Id. at 437.
185. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
186. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-39.
187. Id. at 452.
188. Id. at 441.
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Helvering v. Mitchell,89 Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,1 90 and United
States v. Ward'9' established that criminal penalties can be imposed only in
criminal proceedings. The Halper Court disagreed, holding that "in deter-
mining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it
is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying
nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be evalu-
ated."1 92 Moreover, "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve
a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment."'93 Thus, the lesson to be
learned from Halper is that "the Government is entitled to rough remedial
justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise
formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages without being deemed
to have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy
analysis."'1 94
Simply put, to avoid violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, a civil sanction
must not be punitive, and whether the legislature labels the sanction
"cniminal" or "civil" is not dispositive. "It is commonly understood that civil
proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals "g195 Thus,
a civil remedy or penalty, such as the Controlled Substance Excise Tax, may
take on the characteristics of a pefialty for double jeopardy purposes if the
sanction is grossly disproportionate to the actual damages or costs of
prosecuting a defendant.
Perhaps fearful of a "floodgate" crisis resulting from overuse of double
jeopardy in civil proceedings, the Halper Court limited its decision to "the
rare case . where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-
gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages
he has caused." 9 6 Seizing on the "overwhelmingly disproportionate"
language in that limitation, courts have applied Halper's reasoning to drug
taxes. The need for clear guidance in this area led to the 1994 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.197
189. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
190. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
191. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
192. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7.
193. Id. at 448. But see Eddy v. McGinnis, 523 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind. 1988) ("Unless th[e] sanction
was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal, the double jeopardy clause
provided for the defendant in criminal prosecutions is not applicable.") (quoting Mitchell, 303 U.S. at
398-99) (alteration m original). Both the Eddy and Mitchell decisions, however, preceded the Supreme
Court's Halper decision.
194. Halper, 490 U.S. at 446; see also State v. Riley, 479 N.W.2d 234 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that a $43,600 penalty was remedial, not punitive).
195. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. But see Briney v. State Dep't of Revenue, 594 So. 2d 120 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1991) (finding that Alabama's drug tax was not fundamentally punitive, but remedial in nature).
196. Halper, 490 U.S. at 449.
197. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
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B. Specific Interpretation. The Kurth Ranch Case
In Kurth Ranch, the defendants were a farming family that turned to
growing marijuana to raise revenue to save their Montana farm. After being
apprehended by law enforcement authorities, the Kurth family was assessed
nearly $865,000 in drug taxes and penalties on their plants, marijuana, hash
tar, and hash oil.' 98 The case began as a bankruptcy proceeding, wherein the
Department of Revenue filed a claim for taxes due. Following a trial, the
Bankruptcy Court, relying on Halper, found that the tax assessment served to
punish the Kurths a second time for conduct to which they had pleaded guilty
and been punished.'99 The district court affirmed,2"' and the Department of
Revenue appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with Halper In determining whether
the tax was a civil sanction similar to that at issue in Halper, the court of
appeals reasoned that:
A disproportionately large civil sanction imposed in a subsequent civil
proceeding, however, may constitute "punishment" within double
jeopardy's multiple-punishment prohibition. Although the Montana statute
labels the assessment as a "tax," this in itself is not dispositive as to
whether this imposition constitutes an impermissible second punishment.
A state cannot evade the prohibitions of the federal constitution merely by
changing the label of the punishment. Indeed, "'labels affixed either to the
proceeding or to the relief imposed are not controlling and will not be
allowed to defeat the applicable protections of federal constitutional
law.",'
2 0 1
By focusing on the retributive and deterrent elements of Montana's tax, the
court found that the record lacked any evidence of the proportionality required
for the sanction to be characterized as remedial.20 2 Moreover, the Kurth
Ranch court refused to consider the growing societal costs of fighting drug
abuse in determining proportionality 203 The Ninth Circuit concluded "that
allowing the state to impose this tax, without any showing of some rough
approximation of its actual damages and costs, would be sanctioning a penalty
which Halper prohibts. 20
4
198. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch III), 986 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir.
1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
199. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch I), 145 B.IL 61, 75 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1990), aff'd, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont., Apr. 23, 1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd,
114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
200. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch II), No. CV-90-084-PGH, 1991 WL
365065 (D. Mont., Apr. 23, 1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
201. In re Kurth Ranch IfI, 986 F.2d at 1310 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448) (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 1312. But see Rehg v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 605 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1992) (holding that
the loss suffered by the state must include any tax avoided by the taxpayer, as well as the typical
expense incurred by the state in detecting and prosecuting drug tax cases).
203. In re Kurth Ranch III, 986 F.2d at 1312.
204. Id. Shortly before the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision, the Montana Supreme Court
decided Sorensen v. State Dep't of Revenue, which ignored Halper and found that "a tax requires no
proof of remedial costs on the part of the state." 836 P.2d 29, 33 (Mont. 1992). The Ninth Circuit
criticized Sorensen because the state court's reasoning "ignoreld] the particularized double jeopardy
inquiry required under Halper." In re Kurth Ranch II, 986 F.2d at 1312 n.2.
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Not surprisingly, the State of Montana appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the question of "whether a tax on the possession
of illegal drugs assessed after the State has imposed a criminal penalty for the
same conduct may violate the constitutional prohibition against successive
punishments for the same offense." 25 Justice Stevens, writing for a 5-4
majority, stated that "[t]his drug tax is not the kind of remedial sanction that
may follow the first punishment of a criminal offense. Instead, it is a second
punishment within the contemplation of a constitutional protection that has
'deep roots in our history and jurisprudence.""'2 6
To support its holding, the Court first reiterated the principles from Halper
that "a so-called civil 'penalty' may be remedial in character if it merely
reimburses the government for its actual costs arising from the defendant's
criminal conduct." 2 7 The Court then drew from earlier Supreme Court cases
where it had recognized that "there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punish-
ment." 28 Accordingly, the Court adopted Halper's conclusion that "a tax is
not immune from double jeopardy scrutiny simply because it is a tax. 20 9
Based on that principle, the Court looked to the Montana statute itself and
found that it was "conditioned on the commission of a crime,"210 and that
such a condition is
significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of
revenue.. [T]he tax assessment not only hinges on the commission of
a crime, it also is exacted only after the taxpayer has been arrested for the
precise conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the first place.
Persons who have been arrested for possessing marijuana constitute the
entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax.21 1
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Montana drug tax was punitive in
nature and that it was "too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax
assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double
Jeopardy analysis." 212
C. Application of Halper and Kurth Ranch
The reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Halper and extended in
Kurth Ranch does not apply to all taxes. Indeed, "there is no need for the
civil sanction to be tied to any remedial analysis when it is imposed apart
from a criminal conviction." 213 Thus, the mootness issue arises if the state
205. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994).
206. Id. at 1948 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)).
207. Id. at 1945.
208. Id. at 1946.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1947.
211. Id. (citations omitted).
212. Id. at 1948.
213. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch III), 986 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.
1993), aft'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
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chooses to bring the tax prosecution in the absence of the typical possession
charge. In such a case, the tax penalty would be the only sanction against the
taxpayer and, accordingly, there could be no double jeopardy 214 The Halper
and Kurth Ranch holdings were specifically tailored to the factual situations
before the Court. Halper had been convicted of a crime, then punished with
a civil sanction.2 1 5 Thus, the civil sanction was the second punishment that
placed Halper in double jeopardy The same sequence of events applied to the
Kurth family Logically, however, there is no reason why the civil sanction
cannot be the first punishment, to be followed by a criminal prosecution that
places the defendant in double jeopardy In the case of a drug tax, the
sanction which actually places the defendant in jeopardy for the second time
is simply a matter of timing depending on whether the prosecutor or the
assessor reaches the defendant first. In Kurth Ranch, for example, the tax
assessments took place before the defendants were actually punished
(sentenced) for their crimes.216 If a drug tax is a punishment, it is equally
punitive regardless of whether it is the first or second sanction imposed on the
defendant. If the drug tax comes first, followed by a drug prosecution under
the criminal statutes, then the criminal sentence would trigger the double
jeopardy challenge.2 17
In Indiana, like Montana, the tax on controlled substances will almost
certainly be imposed along with the conviction. The Indiana Act itself is
drafted so that its enforcement will complement a criminal prosecution. For
example, the most basic provisions of the Act are designed to connect
assessment and prosecution. Specifically, section 5 of the Act imposes the tax
214. If the state chose to proceed only under the tax statute, then the double jeopardy question would
indeed be moot. However, assuming that the purpose of the tax is to provide for additional punishment
of the drug offender, prosecution solely for the tax penalty would be icing without cake. This is
especially true considering that the felony provision in the tax statute applies only to drug possessors
whose underlying offense is itself a felony. Thus, prosecuting a misdemeanor drug possessor solely
under the statute would serve only to exact a fine he cannot pay, without the threat of any jail time at
all. Similarly, if the State prosecuted a felony drug possessor for failure to pay the tax without bringing
the underlying felony drug charges, the best-case scenario for the State is a D felony conviction and a
staggering fine (which will also very likely go unpaid). Nevertheless, many felony drug statutes provide
for much heavier A or B felonies and the correspondingly heavier potential jail sentences. See, e.g., IND.
CODE § 35-48-4-1 to -15.
215. As the Halper Court explained: "[U]nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who has
already been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to
the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent
or retribution." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
216. The Kurths were arrested on October 18, 1987, and assessed nearly $865,000 in taxes and
penalties on December 18, 1987. Drummond v. Department of Revenue (In re Kurth Ranch I), 145 B.R.
61, 66, 68 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990), aff'd, 1991 WL 365065 (D. Mont. 1991, Apr. 23, 1991), aff'd, 986
F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). They were sentenced on July 18, 1988. In re
Kurth Ranch I, 986 F.2d at 1310.
217. The Court in Kurth Ranch indicated that "Montana could no doubt collect its tax on the
possession of marijuana, for example, if it had not previously punished the taxpayer for the same
offense, or, indeed, if it had assessed the tax in the same proceeding that resulted in his convic-
tion. Here, we ask only whether the tax has punitive characteristics that subject it to the constraints
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994)
(emphasis added). The implication is that the tax can be either a first or a second punishment, but in
either case it is considered punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
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on controlled substances that are delivered, possessed, or manufactured in
violation of the criminal code.2 18 Thus, the tax is levied only after the
government has determined that a crime has been committed. Moreover, the
"bounty hunter" provisions of the statute award up to ten percent of the taxed
amount to an individual, or thirty percent to a law enforcement agency, for
reporting a drug possessor. 219 Not only is this tax likely to be imposed along
with a conviction, but it is difficult to imagine a taxpayer being taxed without
also being prosecuted for criminal drug offenses.22 Also significant to the
Court in Kurth Ranch was the fact that the same sovereign imposed both the
tax and the criminal penalty The Court used this point to distinguish previous
cases in which taxes on illegal activities were upheld.22" '
The final question to be determined is whether the Indiana tax is a remedial
measure, and therefore permissible; or punitive, and therefore an additional
punishment in violation of taxpayers' double jeopardy rights. So convinced
was the Kurth Ranch Court that the Montana statute was punitive that it
refused to engage in the "rough remedial justice" type of balancing contem-
plated by Halper The State of Montana did not claim that its assessment
remotely approximated the cost of prosecuting the Kurths or, for that matter,
any other costs to the state.222 Moreover, the Court implied that, even if the
State of Montana did make such a showing, such balancing was unnecessary
once a tax was characterized as punitive. The implication from Kurth Ranch
is that such a tax measure would not even be saved by a showing that the
assessment was based on a remedial formula.223
Like Montana's statute, Indiana's Act does not provide for any remedial
purpose. Even before passing the Act, the State of Indiana determined that it
would incur no additional costs by administering the tax.224 Even if the State
did incur costs and damages in the prosecution of drug tax claims, this tax is
not designed to compensate for them. Rather, the Act's provisions distribute
money in various ways that are unrelated to the costs of taxing drug
possessors. For example, up to ten percent of any taxes received may be paid
to the individual who reports the taxpayer.22 ' An additional thirty percent
may be paid to the law enforcement agency that turns in the taxpayer, not to
compensate that agency for the costs of its tax prosecution, but rather as an
incentive to conduct criminal investigations. 2 6 In fact, only twenty percent
of the money collected under the Act may be appropriated to pay the costs of
218. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-5.
219. Id. § 6-7-3-16.
220. See supra note 214.
221. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947 n.22.
222. Id. at 1948.
223. Id. Although the non-remedial nature of the statute was a factor considered by the Kurth Ranch
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in part on the grounds that a tax, unlike a civil sanction,
"need not be based on any benefit accorded to the taxpayer or on any damage or cost incurred by the
Government as a result of the taxpayer's activities." Id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
224. FISCAL IMPACr STATEMENT, supra note 84, at 1 ("The Department of Revenue reports that it
can absorb any administrative costs [of the Act] within its existing budget.").
225. IND. CODE § 6-7-3-16.
226. Id.
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administering and enforcing the Act.227 Similar to the Montana tax interpreted
in Kurth Ranch, the Act's provisions do not provide for any of the "rough
justice" permitted by Halper Rather, any money collected is distributed in
various directions, very little of which has anything to do with enforcing and
administering the Act. Because the Indiana statute is aimed squarely at drug
offenders, will almost certainly be imposed attendant to a criminal prosecu-
tion, and serves no remedial purpose, the Act must be construed as a penalty,
and as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
CONCLUSION
The Controlled Substance Excise Tax is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied in any collection action. As applied, it violates constitutional
safeguards against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, as well as Article
X, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. While its ends may be noble, a
public policy aim of eliminating illegal drug use does not justify the
enactment of a pretextual revenue measure as a means to exact additional
punishment from drug possessors.
Despite Machiavelli's assertions to the contrary, the ends here do not justify
the means. This is particularly true in light of the constitutional barrers
established to prevent an overzealous legislature from abridging the rights of
its citizens to achieve an end that it perceives as worthy These barriers do not
distinguish between good and ill intent on the part of the legislature, but serve
only to limit the power that body has to impose its will on its constituency
While few people can muster a great deal of moral outrage over additional
sanctions on drug dealers and possessors, the more basic concern over the Act
is that a legislature which is permitted to tax without limit will do so, often
to the detriment of those in society who are more sympathetic to the public.
If the legislature wishes to tax controlled substances, numerous cases confirm
its right to do so. It must, however, act within its constitutional bounds. To
allow the legislature to do otherwise would endanger much more than the
pocketbook of the occasional drug dealer or marijuana grower.
227. Id.
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